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LOBBYING ON THE INTERNET AND
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE'S
REGULATION OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Internet technology1 has radically changed the way the world communicates, breaking down barriers since its inception and throughout its
2
various stages of development. The relatively slow wheels of governmental regulatory agencies have not kept pace with the technology's
rapid growth.3 Though Congress has been confronted with a multitude of
1. "Intemet" and "Internet technology" are used in this Note as umbrella terms to
encompass any transmission of information over a worldwide computer network. This
includes the general meaning of the Internet, electronic mail (or "e-mail"), the World
Wide Web, listservs, and so forth. For a thorough but easily digestible description of this
technology and its development, see Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844, 849-53 (1997).
2. See id. at 849-50. In Reno, Justice Stevens defined the Internet and outlined its
development using stipulated facts by the parties as his basis:
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called "ARPANET," which was designed to enable computers
operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with one another by
redundant channels even if some portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an
example for the development of a number of civilian networks that,
eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of
people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts
of information from around the world. The Internet is "a unique and
wholly new medium of worldwide human communication."
3. In recounting the stipulated facts in Reno, Justice Stevens also addressed the
growth of the Internet.
The Internet has experienced "extraordinary growth." The number of "host" computers-those that store information and relay
communications-increased from about 300 in 1981 to approxi-
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issues and questions, it has just recently begun to respond with some initial legislation.4 In the meantime, absent specific legislation, individuals

mately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996. Roughly 60% of
these hosts are located in the United States. About 40 million people
used the Internet at the time of trial, a number that is expected to
mushroom to 200 million by 1999.
Id. at 850. (footnotes omitted). See also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Pending
Key
InternetLegislation,N.Y. L.J., Dec. 9, 1997, at 3.
The law is usually a lagging indicator of business and technology changes. In 1997, legislation began to move more rapidly as the
laws began to adapt to our increasingly networked society. We have
seen the introduction of a host of new federal Interet-related legislation intended to address concerns that include the protection of online privacy, taxation of Intemet-related commerce and services,
regulation of on-line gambling, use of encryption and copyrights in
the digital environment.
Id.
4. A sampling of the issues Congress is now addressing or will soon be forced
to
address includes pornography, gambling, the safe transmission of credit information
for
purchases, copyright issues, implications for traditional businesses of the added
competition of Internet vendors, and jurisdictional questions. See Bill Pietrucha, Internet
Policy
Forum Drawing Top Policy Makers, NE\vsBYTEs NEWS NETWoRK, Jan. 21, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 5028811 (discussing the multitude of issues to be addressed
by policymakers at the Internet Policy Forum to be held February 8-10, 1998, by the Association
for Interactive Media); Jack E. Brown, Obscenity, Anonymity, and DatabaseProtection:
EmergingInternetIssues, 14 No. 10 COMPUTER LAW. 2.
[T]hree of the current legal issues evoked by the Internet [are]:
(1) The jurisdictional reach of one state to make it a criminal or
civil offense to send objectionable Internet communications to another state.
(2) The constitutionality of a state prohibition of anonymity or
pseudonymity in Internet communications.
(3) The scope of copyright protection applicable to Internet
communications or screen displays.
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and organizations are expanding how they communicate and do business
in this new context. For some, whose communications may be regulated
heavily in the context of traditional media or restricted because of the
prohibitive costs of access to traditional media, the Internet provides new
opportunities to reach desired audiences.
Lobbying by charities represents one of those gray areas in which
there is great opportunity, though little guidance in terms of allowability.5 Although lobbying activities by charitable organizations are heavily
6
regulated under the Internal Revenue Code, the regulations do not yet
7
contemplate lobbying via Internet technology. As such, the regulated
organizations play a guessing game as they begin to take advantage of
the technology. Lobbying can be an important tool for charitable organizations to accomplish their missions, and the Internet offers a forum8 and
a method of communication far different from traditional methods. The
Id. at 2; Congress Wrestles with the 'Net: How Much to Regulate is the Knotty Question,
105th
CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 9, 1998, at 2A (stating that "[a]s the second session of the
Congress gets under way, lawmakers are wrestling with a wide range of Internet-related
issues. From taxes to gambling to unsolicited e-mail, dozens of bills have been introduced to restrict or regulate growth of the Interet .... ).
5. Other examples include artists who want to exhibit their work but who cannot
gain recognition by a gallery; cigarette or liquor advertisers who want to reach an audience currently restricted; and pornographers who want to reach audiences by posting sites
on the World Wide Web.
6. See generallyI.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
7. In fact, the Code does not specifically delineate means of lobbying. However,
any references made in the companion Treasury regulations to mode of transmission are
to more traditional means, such as television, radio, and direct mail. See Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-l (1997).
8. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 853. A further recounting of the stipulated facts pertaining to the Internet offers an apt description of the World Wide Web, a commonly used
way of accessing the Internet:
The Web is ... comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to both
a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.
From the publishers' point of view, it constitutes a vast platform
from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of mil-
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question remains, however, whether and how the government will apply
the existing regulations to lobbying using the Internet.

The regulations, as they currently exist, provide no clear mechanism

for the government to determine when lobbying via certain forms has
reached a proscribed level. The Internal Revenue Code's regulations are
largely based on level of expenditure. 9 This basis makes sense in a con-

text of communications over traditional media-radio, television, and

mail-which would incur expenditure levels generally commensurate
with their impact; for example, the more an organization spends on tele-

vision advertising, the wider audience it will generally reach. However,

in the context of the Internet, because of significantly reduced costs

without necessarily any lessening of impact,' 0 expenditure levels may not
lions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can "publish"
information. Publishers include government agencies, educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and individuals.
Publishers may either make their material available to the entire pool
of Internet users, or confine access to a selected group, such as those
willing to pay for the privilege. "No single organization controls any
membership in the Web, nor is there any single centralized point
from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the
Web."
Id. (footnotes omitted); Paul Demko and Jennifer Moore, CharitiesPut the Web to Work,
CHRONICLE OF PILANTHROPY

(Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www.philanthropy.com/articles.dir/

vl0.dir/i24.dir/24website.htm>.
As their initial fascination with the Internet has faded, non-profit
groups are changing the way they use its vast capabilities. What
many first saw as simply a way to showcase their efforts-much like
an electronic billboard-has now become an integral part of how they
carry out their day-to-day work.
Id.
9. See I.R.C. § 501 (1994).
10. See Paul Demko, Acting Up On Line: The Internet Lets Activists Reach Around
the World at Little Cost, CHRONICLE OF PHmiANTHmopy (Apr. 9, 1998) <http:/ /philanthropy.com/articles.dir/vIO.dir/i24.dir/12advocacy.htm> ("On-line technologies
have
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be a sufficient indicator of level of activity. As a result, until (and unless)

the government considers how to tackle this question, there could be a
significant opportunity for organizations that wish to take advantage of
the technology.
Since the early twentieth century, Congress has carved out significant exemptions from taxation for certain organizations created to ad-

vance charitable goals." The exemptions continue a long tradition of
favored treatment in England, which, for centuries, has also exempted

charitable organizations from taxation and other regulations.' 2 In providmade the most dramatic difference to small non-profit groups. In the past, the costs of
bulk-mail appeals or telephone calls limited the number of people those organizations
could reach. But the Internet has in many ways reduced those barriers[.]").
There are arguments on both sides of the question of impact via the Internet. Most
would agree, it seems, that many organizations have found that targeted Internet use can
be extremely effective. See generally Demko & Moore, supra note 8 (detailing several
examples of charities' successful uses of Internet technology).
11. See I.R.C. § 501 (1934); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470
F.2d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Almost since the earliest days of the federal income tax,
Congress has exempted certain corporations from taxation."); see also infra notes 46-68
and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical development of tax exemption in
the United States.
12. See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAw OF CHARrrY: 1532-1827, at 18
(1969) (describing England's Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601). The Statute of
Charitable Uses specified what activities or organizations were to be considered charitable, as outlined in its Preamble:
Whereas lands, tenements, rents annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels, money, and stocks of money, have been heretofore given, limited, appointed, and assigned as well by the Queen's
most excellent majesty, and her most noble progenitors, as by sundry
other well disposed persons: some for relief of aged, impotent, and
poor people, some for maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and
mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universities: some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches,
seabanks and highways, some for education and preferment of orphans; some for or towards the relief, stock, or maintenance for
houses of correction; some for marriages of poor maids; some for
supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and
persons decayed; and others for relief or redemption of prisoners or
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ing these exemptions, the governments of both the United States and
England have recognized an inherent value and necessity in charitable
organizations. 13 Types of nonprofit organizations that are provided some
level of favored treatment under the current Internal Revenue Code include churches, homeless shelters, labor unions, veterans' organizations,

country clubs, community development corporations, nonprofit hospitals,

private foundations, community foundations, many colleges and universities, the American Red Cross, the National Football League, and the
14
Metropolitan Museum of Art.
captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes ....
Id. at 26 (quoting Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Elizabeth I, ch. 4).
13. The government's stated rationale is that "the Government is compensated for
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be
met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare." H.R. REP. No. 1860, at 19 (1938). See generally John W.
Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERCA's VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii-xv (Brian
O'Connell, ed., 1983); Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Third Sector: Keystone of a Caring
Society, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT 363, 363-69 (Brian O'Connell, ed., 1983).
14. A "nonprofit" organization is one that is subject under the Internal Revenue
Code to the "nondistribution constraint," which is explained by Professor Henry B.
Hansmann as follows:
[The] organization ... is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as
members, officers, directors, or trustees .... Net earnings [after reasonable expenses and staff compensation], if any, must be retained
and devoted in their entirety to financing further production of the
services that the organization was formed to provide.
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
Under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, there are three broad categories of nonprofit organizations, each with its own level of benefit and commensurate restrictions.
The National Football League-while considered a nonprofit organization-is in a very
different category from and has very different benefits and restrictions from a small
community-based after-school program for underprivileged children. For a critical look at
some of the institutions granted tax exemption by the Internal Revenue Service, see
GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BoROwsKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY 1-13
(1993).
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Accompanying the privilege of tax exemption is the quid pro quo of
increased regulation. For charities, restrictions on lobbying or political
activities are among the more significant regulations affecting their
work.1 5 Many exempt organizations find it necessary to engage in some
lobbying activities to further their goals, though the level of lobbying or
political activity in which they may engage is limited. 16 For example, an
organization that works to aid immigrants in California may need to take
a position on proposed legislation to remove bilingual education from the
public school system; organizations dedicated to making abortion illegal
may want to lobby for increased state restrictions on abortion or for the
Senate confirmation of a conservative candidate for Supreme Court justice; a coalition that helps the homeless may need to lobby to receive better services; an organization seeking to make school prayer a requirement
may want to persuade members of Congress to legislate in that area.
As with for-profit industry, charitable organizations are finding that
to be effective, they must venture onto the Internet to pursue their
goals. 17 Electronic mail and the World Wide Web offer new ways for

15. See I.R.C. §§ 501,4911,4912,4945 (1994).
16. See Mark Johnson, Foundationsof Power, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 21,
1998, at G1.
17. See Demko & Moore, supra note 8 (noting that "[tihe number of registered
Internet addresses that end in .org-usually used by non-profit groups-has jumped from
an estimated 500 in 1992 to more than 114,000 as of June [1998]"); Wylie Wong, Nonprofits FindFunds, Help on the Web, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 22, 1997, at 37.
If Apple Computer, Inc., and Barnes & Noble, Inc. can look at
the Web and see dollar signs, the American Red Cross figures it can,
too.... With Internet commerce on the rise, nonprofit organizations
and charities are flocking to the fledgling medium ....The World

Wide Web also is a cost-effective way to find new volunteers and
educate people about an organization's mission.
Id.; Michael Barndt, Establishing a Presence-LocalNonprofits On-Line (visited Apr.

12, 1998) <http://wxvw.uvm.edu/People/mbamdt/npdev.htm> (discussing the increased
usage of the Internet for smaller, locally based nonprofit organizations). Barndt further

states:
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charities to reach their constituents or the general public, to seek funding,
and to learn about other initiatives. Charitable organizations may use a
Web site to network among various constituent organizations and other
organizations with similar missions. For the benefit of their constituents,

charitable organizations might also create links from their Web sites to
research posted on the Web or post their own research and analysis that
will be useful to others. Internet technology also opens up new venues

for any lobbying activities in which an organization might choose to engage.
Congress has just begun to regulate the Internet, which has thus far

gone largely unregulated.' 8 The Internal Revenue Code, which is the locus of regulations pertaining to nonprofit organizations-including regulation of lobbying activities-does not, as yet, contain any specific refer-

Nonprofit organizations engaged in delivering a service will find
that Internet can increase their effectiveness. Nonprofit organizations
involved in advocacy will find the Internet an important new outlet
for "publishing" their perspectives on issues. Nonprofit organizations
committed to community development will use Internet as an additional community building tool. Nonprofit organizations valuing open
participation in their work will use Internet to further the democratic
process.
Id.; Jayne Cravens, What Use Is the Internet to a Nonprofit Organization?(last modified

Jun. 21, 1999) <http://www.coyotecom.com/online.html> (listing several of the "tangible
benefits of being on-line": immediate communications via e-mail; research; networking;
posting information; locating volunteers; fund raising; on-line activism). Ms. Cravens
also offers the following general statement:
The value of using the Net as a way to distribute information to
the general public or to find donors/volunteers remains small. However, the Net as a way to network and to communicate with peers is
invaluable, and access to various on-line information depositories can
drastically reduce time needed for research.
Id.

18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (1996) ("The Internet and other interactive computer
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation."); see also infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (discussion of Congress's
first attempt to regulate the Internet and the judicial challenges it has faced).
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19
ences to the use of Internet technology by tax-exempt organizations.
This Note examines the intersection of Internet technology use by charitable organizations and the lobbying restrictions imposed upon those organizations. Parts II and EI provide background for this inquiry: Part II20
outlines the Internal Revenue Code's definitions of exempt organizations; Part I121 discusses lobbying restrictions placed on charitable organizations and the initial restrictions Congress has attempted to place on
Internet technology. Part IV 22 examines how free speech protections apply to the lobbying activities of charitable organizations and to communications via the Internet. Part V23 looks at the mechanisms by which the
Internal Revenue Code monitors lobbying activities and how these
mechanisms might apply to such activities on the Internet. Finally, Part
V124 focuses on the impact of lobbying regulations on private foundations that fund Web site development by public charities.

II.

BACKGROUND ON CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

A. An Introduction to the Lobbying Restrictions
Imposed on CharitableOrganizations
Tax exemption in the United States is handled through the Internal
Revenue Code (hereinafter "the Code") and is thus monitored by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 25 The Code delineates what types of

19. Recently, however, there have been reports that the Internal Revenue Service
is considering asking tax exempt organizations if they have a Web site, and if so, what is
contained on it. See, e.g., IRS Says It Is Beginning Random Audits ofPACS; WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 1998, at A4.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 25-45. While the focus of this article will be
on two categories-publicly supported charities and private foundations-an understanding of the various types of nonprofit entities is important.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 46-87.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 88-131.
23. See infratext accompanying notes 132-177.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 178-203.

25. See I.R.C. § 501 (1994).
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organizations are entitled to tax exemption and outlines a series of regulations and restrictions on the organizations that are granted tax-exempt
status, proscribing three distinct types of activities: political campaign
activities, direct lobbying, and grassroots lobbying. 6 An organization
with a charitable purpose may gain tax exemption under section
501(c)(3) of the Code if "no substantial part of [its] activities [constitutes] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation"2 7 and if it "does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 28 As such,
charitable organizations may not engage in any political campaign activities but may engage in an "insubstantial" amount of activities attempting
to influence legislation.
"Influencing legislation" is broken down into two areas: direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying.29 The distinctions between the two types
lie in their intended audiences and in their content. Direct lobbying is, as
it sounds, directed to anyone who has authority to formulate or enact legislation.30 Grassroots lobbying, on the other hand, consists of efforts "to
influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the
general public or any segment thereof....
In terms of context, a communication would be considered direct
lobbying if it referred to specific legislation (either by name or general
idea) and reflected a view on that legislation.32 Grassroots lobbying
would contain a third element in addition to those two: it would encourage the recipients to take action, such as contacting their elected representatives.33

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See I.R.C. §§ 501,4911,4945 (1994).
Id. § 501(c)(3).
Id.
See id. § 4911(c).
See id. § 4911(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 4911(d)(1)(A).
See 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-2 (1990).
See id. at 51,836.
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B. Categoriesof CharitableOrganizationsUnder the
InternalRevenue Code
In regulating tax-exempt activities that may influence legislation or
political campaigns, the Code separates organizations into several categories, each with different rules.34 First, noncharitable exempt organizations may freely engage in lobbying as long as it involves legislation (actual or proposed) that would affect the organization's ability to accomplish its exempt purpose; 35 examples of such organizations are labor unions, civic leagues, or chambers of commerce.
Two other categories--charities and private foundations-face much
36
more onerous restrictions. A public charity is permitted to engage in a

34. See generally Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking
the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislaive Activities, 71 TEX L. REV. 1269
(1993); John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations:A Review of
Federaland State Policies,in THE NoNPROFrr SEcrOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 6773 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
An altogether different category of organizations regulated in terms of lobbying activities is for-profit business, which may deduct direct lobbying costs as ordinary and
necessary business expenses if there is a cognizable connection between the legislation
and the business's continued welfare. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994). In fact, all three categories
of nonprofit organizations are also permitted under the Code to engage in lobbying if it is
for "self-defense" purposes. See id. § 501(c)(4) (non-charitable exempt organizations); id.
§ 491 1(d)(2)(C) (public charities); id. § 4945(e)(2) (private foundations).
35. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1994).
36. Public charities may be:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part
of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... , and which does not participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any politi-
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minimum of lobbying activities toward its exempt purpose. 37 The level of
lobbying allowed under the Code is measured using one of two methods

chosen by the charity. The default method mandates that the organization

may not devote a "substantial part" of its activities to lobbying.38 If a

charity prefers a more easily calculable and less vague method, it may
elect the second option, which uses a sliding-scale formula to calculate

the percentage of expenditures that may be spent on lobbying activities.39

These methods-along with the penalties imposed for failure to comply
with the regulations-will be discussed in more detail later.40
Private foundations comprise the most restricted category.4 ' The
Code imposes two levels of excise taxes on a foundation-and on its

managers who knowingly authorize a restricted (and thus taxable) ex-

penditure-for any lobbying activities engaged in by the foundation it-

self or by its grant recipients, whether or not necessary for the organization's exempt purpose. 42 There are three very narrow exceptions to this
restriction: (1) providing "technical advice or assistance ...in response

cal campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for pub-

lic office.
Id. § 501(c)(3).
37. See id. § 501(c).
38. See id.
39. See id. § 501(h).
40. See infra notes 132-177 and accompanying text.
41. See I.R.C. § 509 (1994) (defining "private foundation").
42. See id. § 4945(a)(l)-(2). This section imposes a tax of 10% of each lobbying
expenditure on the foundation, and, on any manager who knows that she or he is authorizing a taxable expenditure, the Code imposes a tax of two and one half percent of the
taxable amount "unless such agreement is not willful and is due to reasonable cause." Id.
§ 4945(a)(2). Beyond these initial excise taxes, if the infraction is not remedied, additional penalties are imposed: 100% of the expenditure is imposed on the foundation, and
50% on the manager if she or he "refused to agree to part or all of the correction." Id. §
4945(b)(2). "Correction" is defined as "with respect to any taxable expenditure, ... recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, and where full
recovery is not possible such additional corrective action as is prescribed by the... regulations ... ." Id. § 4945(i)(1)(A).
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3
to a written request by [a governmental] body"4 ; (2) lobbying about a
possible legislative decision that "might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to such foundation" (commonly called the
"self-defense" exception); and (3) "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research.'A4

Ill. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
A. Lobbying Restrictions:HistoricalDevelopment and
PolicyRationales
Lobbying restrictions imposed on nonprofit organizations by Congress via the Code have increased in scale and scope since they were first
introduced; 46 however, the public policy rationale for them has remained
essentially constant.47 The history of lobbying restrictions shows a gradual evolution from the early part of the twentieth century, when there
48
set of restrictions.
were no restrictions at all, to the current multilevel
Before the mid-1930s, the Internal Revenue Code contained no explicit
restrictions on campaign or lobbying activities, although it denied 49tax
partisan propaganda.
exemption to any organization that disseminated
One impetus for adding restrictions came from the unlikely source of
a 1930 Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Slee v. Commissioner,50 in which the court articulated a public policy rationale for man51
tax exemption.
dating neutrality among organizations that are provided
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 4945(e)(2).
Id. § 4945(e).
Id.
See, e.g., Galston, supra note 34, at 1275-1336.

47.
48.
49.
50.

See id.
See id.
See Treas. Regs. 45, art. 517 (1919).
42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930) (charitable deduction denied for contributions

to an organization primarily engaged in lobbying activities).

51. See id.
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In the context of the political and social debate over birth control that
was raging in the 1920s and 1930s, Judge Learned Hand stated:
Political agitation as such is outside the statute, however inno-

cent the aim, though it adds nothing to dub it "propaganda," a

polemical word used to decry the publicity of the other side.
Controversies of that sort must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them.52

This statement formed the basis of what is currently known as the
"public benefit subsidy theory," which suggests that in providing a tax
exemption to an organization deemed charitable, the government is pro-

viding that organization with a subsidy equal to the amount of its lost tax

revenue.53 Under this theory, therefore, nonprofit organizations should
not be allowed to use this government subsidy to influence the political
or legislative process, because then government funds would be used to
impact other government activity. 54
As a direct outgrowth of Slee, 55 Congress-in the Revenue Act of
1934-added the currently used language that "no substantial part" of an
organization's activities may constitute "carrying on propaganda, or oth-

52. Id. Judge Hand was referring specifically to section 214(a)(1 l)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 227) and section 214(a)(10) of the Revenue
Acts of
1924 and 1926 (26 U.S.C.A. § 955(a)(10)), which allowed tax deduction of
gifts made to
"any corporation ...organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or education purposes, including posts of the American Legion
or ...for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals."--Id at 184. The question
in Slee was
whether the American Birth Control League was organized for charitable purposes
according to those Acts. See id. The court held that because of the political nature
of the
League's activities, exemption for deductions to the organization could not
be allowed.
See id.at 184-86.
53. See JAMEs J. FisimAN & STEPHEN ScHWARz, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERiALS

314-17 (1995).

54. See id.
55. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
854
(1972) (stating that "[t]he case which led to the 1934 legislation was Slee
v. CommissioneroflnternalRevenue").
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56
erwise attempting, to influence legislation." The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 then imposed the restriction against any political campaign activities by charitable organizations, prompting revocation of an organization's tax-exempt status for violation of this rule. In the Tax Reform
tax
Act of 1969, Congress created the regulatory scheme imposing 5excise
8 adding
expenditures,
lobbying
penalties on private foundations for
three exceptions for nonpartisan analysis, lobbying in self defense, and
59
providing technical assistance on request. The last major change to the
regulations came in 1976, when Congress added the option for public
charities to be able60 to calculate allowable lobbying expenditures using a
mathematical test.
Congress has articulated the public subsidy rationale more recently
in modifying and tightening the restrictions and their enforcement. For
instance, the House Report on the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987,
which included provisions to improve enforcement of the lobbying restrictions, contains the following statement:

The prohibition on political campaign activities and the restrictions on lobbying activities by charities reflect Congressional
policies that the U.S. Treasury should be neutral in political affairs, and that substantial activities directed to attempts to influence legislation should not be subsidized through the tax benefits
61
contributors.
accorded to charitable organizations and their
62
This statement has often been cited by courts upholding the restrictions.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-517 (1934).
See I.R.C. § 4945 (1954).
See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1) (1969).
See I.R.C. § 4945(e)(2), 4945(f) (1969).
See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 1720

(1976).
61.
2313.
62.

H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1903 (1987), reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,

854 (1972).
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Fear of undue influence by exempt organizations and their managers
and directors has prompted some of Congress's individual enactments in
terms of lobbying restrictions. For example, one commentator notes that
the relevant portion of the 1934 legislation--denying tax exemption
to
organizations that had a substantial part of their activities directed at influencing legislation-was "added in the Senate as a floor amendment,
aimed at curbing one specific organization (the National Economy
League), and was not, according to its sponsor, intended to restrict legislative activities of other 'worthy institutions."' 63
One source that provoked concern was a 1977 report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, which said in part that
"foundation lobbying may represent nothing more than the personal political preferences of founders, major donors, and managers." 64 Commentators and members of Congress have often cited this report. For example, in the 1990 Congressional debates on the Senatorial Election Campaign Act,65 Senator McConnell proposed an amendment that would
bring tax-exempt organizations engaging in lobbying and political campaign activity "firmly under the authority of the Federal election laws,
where the rest of us have to look for guidance on election activity. 6 6 In
offering this amendment, Senator McConnell relied on the Commission's
findings, stating, "Unfortunately, some of these organizations have gone
beyond their original charitable and societal purposes and have instead
63. Harvey P. Dale, Lobbying and PoliticalActivities of Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 287 PLI/TAX 7, 15 (1989) (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (remarks
of Senator Reed)); see also Dennis Mclinay, Four Moments in Time, FOUNDATION
NEws &
COMMErrARY, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 30-36 (chronicling "four major Congressional
investigations of foundations this century"--the Walsh Commission in 1912, the
Cox Committee in 1952, the Reece Committee in 1953, and the Patman Committees in
1961).
64. Galston, supranote 34, at 1302 (quoting COMIIvflSSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROpy AND PUBLIC NEEDS, Limitations on Lobbying by Charitable
Organizations, in 5 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY

AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2945, 2953 (1977)). See also Mcllnay, supra note 63,
at 30-32 (discussing the Walsh Commission's attacks on several large private foundations,
including
those created by John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie).

65. See 136 CONG. REc. S11173-01 (daily ed. July 31, 1990).
66. Id. at S11188 (statement of Sen. McConnell).
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exerted considerable influence on elections in this country ....67
Several commentators have noted the ironic consequences of the Internal Revenue Code's different levels of restrictions for different types
of organizations. For example, one commentator notes, "[O]n their face
the Code's restrictions on lobbying are more onerous for organizations
formed to promote the public interest and more generous for entities
formed to serve private or commercial interests; thus, they make it
than for noncommercial interests to encheaper for businesses to lobby
68
activities.,
gage in the same
B. Highlighting "Educational"Activities to Serve Dual Purposes
In two very distinct settings, Congress has touted "educational" purposes as something worth preserving and encouraging: in its granting of
69
tax exemption to charitable organizations and in its first attempt to
70 One of the organizational purposes
regulate and restrict the Internet.
granted exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code is "educational., 71 The applicable Treasury regulations break the category of
"educational" into two general definitions: one covering traditional educational institutions (e.g., colleges and universities), and the other coveron subjects
ing organizations that provide "[i]nstruction of the public
7 2 Despite sevcommunity.
the
to
beneficial
and
individual
useful to the
eral court challenges to the definitions and the standards used by IRS
officials to apply them, Congress and the IRS have remained steadfast in
their commitment to educational organizations, including those that re73
semble advocacy organizations.
67. Id.
68. Galston, supra note 34, at 1271-72.
69. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).

70. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(3) (1996).
71. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c)(3)-l(d)(3) (1986).

73. The evolution of the IRS standards for "educational" is tumultuous and very

interesting. In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the standard for determining whether an organization is educational was unconstitution-
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The government's encouragement of the educational value of non-

profit organizations has been longstanding and essential to the work of

charitable organizations throughout the country. 74 Many commentators
have noted the inherent value and necessity of philanthropy in developing new ideas and taking on high-risk projects that the government and
private industry cannot or will not pursue.75 "As one former legislative
counsel at the Treasury Department has argued, because of charity's
openness to creativity and change, 'the role played by nonprofit organi-

zations is not only desirable but may very well be a prerequisite to the
76

continuation of a democratic society.'
Similarly, Congress has referred in its policy statements to the Internet's considerable educational value, indicating a commitment to keeping the Internet relatively unfettered by regulation. For example, when
Congress placed the first restrictions on Internet content in the Communications Decency Act (to be discussed in more detail in the next section), the statute's policy statements included the following: "The rapidly
developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services

available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in
the availability of educational and informational resources to our citi-

ally vague. See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1037 (D.C.
Cir.
1980). Following that decision, the IRS clarified the standard by promulgating a
new test
for applying it; the test was declared by the U.S. Tax Court to cure the vagueness.
See
Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 558, 588-89 (1994), affd on
other
grounds, 37 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B.
729
(promulgating a set of criteria for determining whether advocacy by an organization
qualifies as educational, which formed the basis for the court's opinion in Nationalist
Movement). For a full discussion of the "educational" standard and its various interpretations, see generally Tommy F. Thompson, The Availability of the FederalEducational
Tax Exemption for PropagandaOrganizations,18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 487 (1985).
74. See Gardner, The Independent Sector, supra note 13, at xii ("Government and
the voluntary sector have had important, often productive, relationships since
colonial

days.").

75. See id. at xiii-xv; Nielsen, The Third Sector: Keystone of a CaringSociety,
supra note 13, at 363-69.
76. Galston, supra note 34, at 1319 (quoting Lawrence M. Stone, Federal
Tax
Support of Charitiesand Other Exempt Organizations:The Need for a National
Policy,
1968 U.S. CAL. L. CmR. TAx INST. 27, 39).
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zens"; 77 "the Internet and other interactive computer services offer a fofor
rum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities
78
activity.
intellectual
for
cultural development, and myriad avenues
C.

The Government s InitialForaysinto Internet Regulation

The Internet has been relatively free from government regulation
from its origins as a military and university experiment in communications, 79 to its current existence as a widely used and quickly growing
multimedia means of communications and information dissemination.
This fact was recognized by Congress in its first attempt to regulate "offensive material"80 posted on the Web in a companion statute to the
Communications Decency Act of 1996.81
The legislative findings touted at the beginning of the companion act
2
speak to the rapid growth of the Internet and make strong statements in
favor of protecting individual freedom on the Internet: "The Internet and
other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all
83
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation." The policy
statements at the beginning of the section also indicate a strong tendency
toward freedom from regulation on the Internet:
It is the policy of the United States ... to promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer ser-

77.

47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (1996).

78. Id. § 230(a)(3).
79. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (describing
the Internet as "the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called
'ARPANET,' which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense
contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with
one another by redundant channels even if some portions of the network were damaged in
a war") (footnote omitted); see also supra note 2.
80. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (1996).

81. See id. § 223(a)-(h).
82. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(1) (1996).
83. Id. § 230(a)(4).
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vices and other interactive media; to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and

other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation; to encourage the development of technologies

which maximize user control over what information is received

by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services .... 4
The Communications Decency Act and its companion statutes were
subject almost immediately to successful judicial challenges, which will
be discussed below.85 What stands now in terms of Internet regulation is
minimal. Public will seems to be leaning toward extremely limited regulation in favor of user control.86 However, as the Internet continues to
develop, and other segments of the population begin to use it as a tool,
there will likely be more attempts by Congress to regulate certain aspects
84. Id. § 230(b)(1)-(3).
85. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (outlining the successful court
challenges to the CDA).
86. In general, Internet industry representatives (in response to appeals from the
general public) and government agencies are looking for means through which individual
users (and their parents, in the case of children) can "self-regulate" Internet content
received, screening out material they do not wish to see. This type of self-regulation is
seen
as the best hope for mediating between the conflicting interests of people who want
to
protect children and others from "obscene" or offensive materials versus those
who
champion free speech in all contexts, but particularly on the as-yet-unregulated Internet.
See generally Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Nvo Regulation, Government Regulation,
or
Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contractingfor Governance in
Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 475, 483 (1997) (discussing "three possible models
for regulating cyberspace: no regulation, government regulation, and self-regulation");
Thomas E. Weber, Technology Internet Plans Self-Regulation of the Industry:
New
Measures Are Aimed at ProtectingChildrenfrom On-Line Stalkers, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 1,
1997, at B16 (discussing a gathering of Internet industry leaders to showcase industry
attempts at Internet self-regulation); Lawrence J. Magid, Kids, Surfing Safety and
Other
Considerations,L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1997, at D8 (stating that "the issues surrounding
kids and the Internet have for several years now been the focus of one of the fiercest
arguments in cyberspace, and the controversy shows no signs of abating"); Spencer S.
Hsu,
Backer ofInternetFiltersSeeks Governor'sAid, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1988, at VI
(discussing recent attempts in Virginia to regulate the Internet in that state).
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87
of Internet use.

IV. FREE SPEECH? EQUAL PROTECTION?
DIFFERENT PROTECTIONS FOR DIFFERENT CONTEXTS

A. FailedAttempts to ChallengeLobbying or
PoliticalActivity Restrictions
As discussed above, 8 heavy restrictions-including those restrictions on lobbying-are the quid pro quo of the benefits of tax exemption.

Although Congress has expressed strong support for tax exemptions for
charities, 8 9 it has also mandated that organizations gaining this valuable
exemption must limit some of their freedoms-one of which is the freeupheld by several federal courts
dom of speech.90 This mandate has
91 been
Court.
Supreme
the
and twice by
Over the years, several organizations have attempted to challenge the
lobbying restrictions on constitutional grounds. Most attempts have
93
failed.92 For instance, in Haswell v. United States, the U.S. Court of
87. Infact, Congress is already considering additional forms of regulation. See
generally Pietrucha, InternetPolicy Forum DrawingTop PolicyMakers,supra note 4.
88. See supranotes 39-51 and accompanying text.
89. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994); see also Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charitiesand Other Exempt Organizations:The Needfor a NationalPolicy 1968
U.S. CAL. L. CTR.TAX INST. 27, 39.
90. See, e.g., Pietrucha, InternetPolicy Forum DrawingTop Policy Makers, supra
note 4.
91. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540
(1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); National Alliance v. United
States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
92. One challenge was successful. In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States; 631
F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980), a "nonprofit organization with a feminist orientation" and
publisher of a monthly newspaper titled Big Mama Rag, which had been denied tax exemption, argued that the Internal Revenue Code's definition of "educational" (as one type
of organization that may be granted exemption) was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at
1032. The court found the argument persuasive. See id. at 1037. Even in holding the pro-
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Claims held that restrictions imposed on the Code's various categories of
nonprofit organizations were not unjustifiably discriminatory. 94 In

Haswell, the petitioner attempted to obtain a refund for contributions

made to the National Association of Railroad Passengers ("NARP"), an
organization formed to "encourage and promote maintenance and improvement of passenger services, operations, and facilities of American
railroads. 95 Petitioner argued, inter alia, that the Code's denial of tax

deductions for contributions to NARP because of NARP's substantial

lobbying activities was unjustifiably discriminatory as compared to two
other classes of organizations: businesses that are permitted to deduct the
costs of lobbying as ordinary and necessary business expenses, and lar-

ger nonprofit organizations that can engage in a far greater level of lob-

bying before it becomes "substantial." 96 This argument failed.9 7 The
court noted a difference between "[a] small organization that devotes a
substantial part of its energies and resources to attempts to influence leg-

islation" and "a large organization that utilizes only an insubstantial and
relatively small part of its total resources for such legislative activities. 9 8
The court further stated:

vision unconstitutional because of its vagueness, however, the court was careful to note
that "First Amendment activities need not be subsidized by the state ... ." Id. at 1034.
The IRS subsequently modified the definition of "educational" and the "full and fair
exposition" requirement to be less vague; this modification has been recognized in more
recent cases. See, e.g., NationalAlliance, 710 F.2d at 875 (stating that the Methodology
Test recently added by the IRS to clarify the "full and fair exposition" requirement "reduces the vagueness found by the Big Mama decision"); Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 558, 583 (1994), aff'd on other grounds, 37 F.3d 216, 218 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Methodology Test did indeed cure the vagueness); see also
supra note 73 for a brief discussion of the "educational" standard and infra notes 101-107
and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of NationalAlliance.
93. 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied,419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
94. See id. at 1150.
95. Id. at 1136.
96. See id.at 1146.
97. See id. at 1148.
98. Id. at 1150.
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[S]uch a classification [is] appropriate. Contributors to an organization whose political activities involve only an insubstantial
part of its total efforts are motivated to different objectives, and
their interests permit recognition as a separate class. Contributors
to an organization that has as a primary purpose political action
and whose political activities require a substantial part of its total
efforts, on the other hand, have different interests and objectives
for their payments. Congressional interest in prevention of the
99
use of tax funds to support lobbying is compelling.
also applied this holding to the deductions allowed for busiThe court
1° °
nesses.
More frequent challenges to the lobbying restrictions have come in
the form of First Amendment challenges, particularly regarding the freedom of speech. In one case, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia rejected a free speech challenge to the IRS's refusal to
called the National Alliance as an exempt "educacertify an organization
tional" institution. 101 The National Alliance issued newsletters, bulletins,
books, and pamphlets for the "stated purpose of arousing in white
Americans of European ancestry 'an understanding of and pride in their
racial and cultural heritage."' 10 2 The National Alliance's literature included severe statements about black "savagery" 103 and "Jewish manipulation of American society." 1 4 The court upheld the IRS's finding that
99. Id.
100. See id.

101. See National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
102. Id. at 869.
103.

Id. at 872.

104. Id. at 872 n.10. Specifically, the court noted that the general theme of most
issues of National Alliance's newsletter Attack! was that "'non-whites'-principally
blacks-are inferior to white Americans of European ancestry ("WAEA"), and are aggressively brutal and dangerous; Jews control the media and through that means-as well
as through political and financial positions and other means-cause the policy of the
United States to be harmful to the interests of WAEA." Id. at 871. "The organization's
newsletter describes its themes of black savagery or Jewish manipulation as warnings to
WAEA of the 'dangers which arise from the presence of so many alien groups in our
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the organization did not meet the Internal Revenue Code's definition of
an "educational" institution, therefore denying it tax exemption. 0 5 In
response to National Alliance's free speech challenge, the court responded, "We have no doubt that publication of the National Alliance
material is protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by law.
But it does not follow that the First Amendment requires a construction
of the term 'educational' which embraces every continuing dissemination
of views.' 0 6 Because National Alliance's publications offered only a
one-sided viewpoint, the organization did not satisfy the Code's "educa10 7
tional" standard.
In another First Amendment challenge, the Christian Echoes National Ministry, after having its tax exemption revoked for excessive lobbying activities, filed a suit on the basis of the constitutional protection
of the free exercise of religion; this suit also failed. 0 8 The Tenth Circuit
held that this revocation did not unconstitutionally abridge the organization's First Amendment rights, stating:
We hold that the limitations imposed by Congress in Section
501(c)(3) are constitutionally valid. The free exercise clause of
the First Amendment is restrained only to the extent of denying
tax exempt status and then only in keeping with an overwhelming and compelling Governmental interest: That of guarantying
midst.' A National Alliance membership bulletin state[d] that these perceived dangers
[could] only be averted by the removal of non-whites and Jews from society. Issues of
Attack! advocate[d] that the removal be violent." Id. at 872-73 (citation and footnotes

omitted).
105. See id. at 869-73. The court held that the organization's materials did not
meet the Code's requirement that they "present] a sufficiently full and fair exposition of
the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion
or conclusion." Id. at 870. See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)l(d) (1988).
106. NationalAlliance,710 F.2d at 875 (citations omitted).
107. See id. at 873; see also supra note 73 for a brief discussion of the "educational" standard.
108. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856
(10th Cir. 1972).
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that the wall separating church and state remain high and firm.

Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has twice upheld the Treasury Department's regulation of lobbying in the face of free speech challengesonce in the 1959 case Cammarano v. United States110 and more recently
in the oft-cited 1983 case Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington."' In Cammarano,the petitioners (who were retail sellers of
wine and beer) argued that denial of a business deduction for publicity
regarding proposed legislation that would have imposed statewide prohi1 12 Justice
bition against alcohol sales in Arkansas was unconstitutional.
Harlan, writing for the Court, responded:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being
required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own
pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
.... [I]t appears to us to express a determination by Congress
that since purchased publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community should stand on the same footso far as the Treasury of the United
ing as regards its purchase
113
concerned.
States is
The Court thus held that the Treasury regulations did not present a subFirst Amendment guarantee of
stantial constitutional issue under
1 14 the
freedom of speech or of the press.

109.

Id. at 856-57.

110. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
111. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
112.

See Cammarano,358 U.S. at 513.

113. Id.
114. See id. at 512-13. The petitioners were beer and liquor wholesalers lobbying
to defeat legislative proposals that, in one instance, would have placed retail sale of wine
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In Regan, the plaintiff organization, Taxation With Representation of
Washington ("TWR"), filed suit after being denied tax exemption by the
IRS, seeking a declaratory judgment that it qualified for tax-exempt
status.115 TWR's primary arguments centered on the First Amendment
and an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment. TWR argued
that because it provides exemptions for veterans' organizations but
would not provide an exemption for TWR, the IRS was acting in a discriminatory manner. 1 6 Both claims were denied in a clear validation of
the Code's distinctions.1 17 The Court distinguished the government's restriction of lobbying from the government's failure to subsidize lobbying: "The issue in this case is not whether TWR must be permitted to
lobby, but whether Congress is required to provide it with public money
with which to lobby ....[W]e hold that it is not."' " 8
B.

CurrentChallenges to InternetRegulations

In stark contrast to the courts' unwillingness to entertain constitutional challenges to lobbying restrictions are the early judicial responses
to constitutional challenges to Internet regulations. After President Clinton signed the Communications Decency Act of 1996'19 ("CDA" or
"Act") into law on February 8, 1996, suits were filed-within days of the
law's passage-in several venues challenging the validity of the law on
constitutional grounds. In two of three cases 20 in which judges considered the question, preliminary injunctions on constitutional grounds were
issued precluding enforcement of the Act's provisions: in American Civil

and beer exclusively in the state of Washington's control, and in the other instance,
would have imposed a statewide prohibition in Arkansas. See id. at 500-02.
115. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 542.
116. See id. at 546-47.
117. See id. at 548.
118. Id. at 551.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1996).
120. See e.g., Sanger v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 151, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (The third
case was deemed not justiciable on First Amendment grounds).
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Liberties Union v. Reno,'12 ' a federal district court granted a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the CDA on First Amendment

123
grounds; 122 and in Shea v. Reno, another federal district court granted a

preliminary injunction on grounds that plaintiffs had a cognizable claim
that the CDA is unconstitutionally overbroad, though not unconstitutionally vague. 124 These cases were followed within a year by the Supreme
125
Court's determination in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union that
as facially overbroad in violation of
the CDA is indeed unconstitutional
26
the First Amendment.

1

There has been a strong debate raging among government actors and
agencies regarding the appropriate areas for, and levels of, Internet regulation. On the one hand, "more than 300 members of Congress have cosponsored bills to regulate the Internet, from electronic commerce to
127 On the other hand, policymakers across a
copyrights to content ....
121. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
122. See id. at 883.
123. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
124. See id. at 950.
125. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
126. See id. at 885. In addition to holding the CDA to be unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds under the First Amendment, the Court in Reno held that in a limited
instance, by virtue of its severability clause, part of the CDA could be saved from a facial
overbreadth challenge through the removal of the phrase "or indecent" from the "indecency" provision, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1996), which "applies to 'any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent.'"Id.
at 883. The Court further stated that the appellees:
[did] not challenge the application of the statute to obscene speech,
which, they acknowledge[d], can be banned totally because it enjoys
no First Amendment protection ....As set forth by the statute, the
restriction of "obscene" material enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for "indecent" material, which we have held unconstitutional. Therefore, we wvill sever the term "or indecent" from the
statute, leaving the rest of § 223(a) standing. In no other respect,
however, can § 223(a) or § 223(d) be saved by such a textual surgery.
Id. (citations omitted).
127. Pietrucha, InternetPolicy Forum DrawingTop PolicyMakers, supranote4.
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broad spectrum of federal governmental offices and agencies have articu-

lated a commitment to minimal regulation. 128 Former Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") Reed Hundt "called for a
Free Internet Law that would protect service providers from government
regulation.', 129 FCC Commissioner Susan Ness has also spoken, though

less emphatically than Hundt, of a commitment to minimal regulation:
"Throughout the evolution of the Internet, the FCC has been careful to

tread lightly ....We want to promote investment and innovation, not

unnecessary work for government and unnecessary constraints on business and consumers.' 30 Furthermore, President Clinton has expressed a
desire for an unburdened Internet while seeking to give parents the tools
they need to protect their children from "inappropriate material.''

128. Several members of Congress have taken up the opposite banner of those
seeking to introduce regulation, stating, for example, "We want to keep the infection of
regulation out of the Internet." Internet Heads Tauzin's 'To-Do' List, MULTIMEDIA
DAILY, Jan. 28, 1998, at 17 (quoting Rep. W.J. Tauzin, who serves as chair of the House
Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection). The
article also references Senator John McCain, chair of the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee, as making "a similar promise." Id.
129. John Breeden, DepartingFCC ChairmanHundt Warns of Threats to Internet,
16 GOV'T COMUTERRNEws, at 8 (Sept. 8, 1997).

130. Bill Pietrucha, FCC's Ness Calls for Internet Friendly FCC Policies,

NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 10, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 5029608.

131.

See Juliana Gruenwald, Congress, Uneasy with Net's Ways, Wants Laws, SAN

DiEGO UNiON-TRm., Feb. 10, 1998, at 4 ("In his State of the Union address on Jan[uary]

27, Clinton said, 'We must give parents the tools they need to help protect their children
from inappropriate material on the Net, but we also must make sure that we protect the
exploding global commercial potential of the Internet."'); see alsoNew Media, COMM.
DAILY, Oct. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13779896 ("President Clinton reiterated
[the] Administration's concern Thurs[day] about overregulation of [the] Internet ....
Clinton said [the] U.S. 'is trying to get all the countries in the world to promise not to
overly regulate or tax or burden the Internet so that we can get more information out.").
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V. HOW WILL THE CURRENT TESTS FOR LOBBYING ACTIVITIES FARE IN
THE CONTEXT OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGY?

A- Testing Optionsfor LobbyingActivities
The Code offers two methods of "calculating" lobbying expenditures
to determine if an organization qualifies for, or should remain eligible
for, tax exemption. The default method-the one in place since the Tax
Reform Act of 1934 132-is the "substantial part test," which comes
straight from the definition of a section 501(c)(3) organization: an otherwise charitable organization qualifies for tax exemption if "no substantial
part of [its] activities [constitutes] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation., 133 The other method of computabased
tion, which may be elected by any public charity, is a sliding scale
134 it was
on the overall budget and expenditures of an organization;
of dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the
added by Congress because
"substantial part" test. 135 In the context of lobbying over the Internet, the
calculation method chosen by the charity is crucial.
The phrase "no substantial part" has never been explicitly defined by
the IRS or in the Code. 136 Interpretations of it have generally come from
case law. In several early cases, courts found the substantial part test to
be difficult to apply and attempted to quantify the levels in terms of expenditures. 137 More recent cases have rejected those attempts, however,
132.

Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216 (1934); see also supra note 56 and

accompanying text.
133. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
134. See id. § 501(h).
135. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 1720
(1976); see also Lobbying by Charities; Lobbying by Private Foundations, 53 Fed. Reg.
51826, 51827 (1988) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 56) ("Congress was aware
...of the belief that the vague standards of the substantial part test tended to create uncertainty and allow subjective and selective enforcement.").
136. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
137. See, e.g., Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955)
(finding that five percent of activities devoted to lobbying was clearly not excessive). The
court in Seasongood does not seem to have examined other factors besides level of ex-
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finding that the inquiry should be a balancing test.138 For example, the
U.S. Court of Claims stated the following in 1974:
The political efforts of an organization must be balanced in the
context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization
to determine whether a substantial part of its activities is to influence, or is an attempt to influence, legislation. A percentage
test to determine whether the activities are substantial is not appropriate. Such a test obscures the complexity of balancing the
organization's activities in relation to its objectives and circumstances in the context of the totality of the organization. 139
The test generally used now is such a balancing test, taking into consideration all of the activities of the organization and examining its attempts
to influence legislation in light of several factors, including "the percentage of [the] organization's budget (or employee time) spent on lobbying;
the continuous or intermittent nature of the organization's legislative involvement; the nature of the organization and its aims; and, realistically,
the controversial nature of the organization's position and its visibil' 14 0
ity.

Alternatively, under the expenditure test, codified at section 501(h)
of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS's sole inquiry is into expenditure
amounts; the IRS looks at two broad categories of expenditures to determine the proper calculation. 14 1 The starting point is the charity's operating budget, which includes all expenditures made toward the organization's exempt purpose, including lobbying expenditures. 42 From that
base point, the organization determines for a given tax year its "lobbying
penditure in making its determination that the "substantial" threshold
was not crossed.
See id.
138. See, e.g., Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl.
1974), cert.
denied,419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
139. Id.
140. FisHNr
& ScHVAz, supra note 53, at 504.
141. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (1994).
142. See id.
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nontaxable amount"--the total amount it can spend on all lobbying acwithin
44
tivities 14 -and its "grassroots nontaxable amount"-the amount
lobbying.'
grassroots
to
devoted
be
can
that
amount
lobbying
total
the
Applying both of these tests to the context of the Internet, a significant distinction emerges. Under the traditional substantial part test, the

IRS will look at the totality of the circumstances rather than just financial

14 5
minimal
146
indicators as under the expenditure test. Costs are generally
World Wide Web,
the
on
information
post
to
for an organization
which creates an interesting disparity in how the activity would be
treated under the two lobbying tests. Suppose an organization with an
annual budget of $100,000 posts a statement regarding pending legisla-

143. The "lobbying nontaxable amount" is measured based on the following slidthe
ing scale: 20% of the first $500,000 of the operating budget; $100,000 plus 15% of
between
amount
the
of
10%
plus
$175,000
$1,000,000;
amount between $500,000 and
See
$1,000,000 and $1,500,000; and $225,000 plus 5% of any amount over $1,500,000.
See
expenditures.
lobbying
total
in
id. § 4911 (c)(2). The amount is capped at $1,000,000
id.
144. The "grassroots nontaxable amount" is equal to 25% of the lobbying nontaxable amount. See id. § 491 1(c)(4).
145. See Lobbying by Charities; Lobbying by Private Foundations, 53 Fed. Reg.
51826, 51827 (1988) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 56) ("In contrast to the subdo
stantial part test ... the expenditure test imposes no limit on lobbying activities that
not require expenditures, such as certain unreimbursed lobbying activities conducted by
bona fide volunteers.").
146. The real costs for posting materials on the Internet can be incurred in the iniof a Web site, which often includes hiring a graphics firm to design a site.
set-up
tial
Once it is in place, posting materials or generating 'hyperlinks" to other posted materials
can be done at a minimal cost. Other costs can include the maintenance of the site, which
its
generally includes paying a service fee to another organization that houses the site on
NEWSWEEK,
Web,
the
on
Money
Make
Can
You
Hogan,
own network. See generally Mike
disJune 23, 1997, at N2 (one of the many articles available in print and on the Internet
services
receive
often
which
charities,
for
cussing costs). Even those costs can be reduced
for significantly reduced costs. For example, a New York-based Web design company,
Mediapolis, charged the Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network "just $5,000 for
it
design work that would normally cost about $10,000; it also donate[d] software that
8. See
normally charges customers $50,000 a year to use." Demko & Moore, supra note
maintealso infra text accompanying notes 168-177 (discussion of whether set-up and
expenditures).
lobbying
considered
be
should
nance costs
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tion on the Web, urging readers to call their representatives to vote a particular way. Suppose the cost of this posting is $1,000, including
staff
time to type it into a readable format and to submit it to the organization's Internet provider. 147 Suppose further that the Web site on which
this call to action is posted is visited by thousands of people, and the
response in the legislators' offices is significant. Phone calls, letters, and
emails come in regularly, asking legislators to vote as suggested in
the
posting. Under the expenditure test, the amount spent is only five percent
of the annual allowable expenditures for an organization with a budget
that size. 148 Even considering this to be grassroots lobbying, as it would
be, 149 the expenditures are well under the threshold, representing
only

147. The cost of posting information on the Web varies depending
on individual
organizations' arrangements. However, for almost any organization,
the costs are extremely low. This hypothetical assumes that most of the set-up costs
are already paid. For
a discussion of the impact this has on the reach some organizations
could achieve, see
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
[T]he Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive
commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds. The Government estimates that "[a]s
many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and that figure
is
expected to grow to 200 million by 1999." This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional print
and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as
interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can
become a pamphleteer.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
148. This is calculated as follows: Because the organization's
budget is only
$100,000, the lobbying nontaxable amount is 20% of that budget, or
$20,000. See supra
note 143. $1,000 is thus only 5% of that limit.
149. This activity would be grassroots lobbying because it is an "attempt
to influence ...legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the
general public or a
segment thereof ...." I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1)(A) (1994). It meets the
three-part test for
grassroots lobbying, because it refers to specific legislation, reflects
a view on the legislation, and encourages the recipient to take action. See Lobbying by Charities;
Lobbying by
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15
would
twenty percent of the allowable grassroots expenditure. ' There
expendithe
question
not
would
IRS
the
and
not seem to be any problem,
tures.
The substantial part test, however, paints a different picture. Under
and
this test, the IRS looks at the other activities of the organization
151
the
Although
lobbying.
the
of
impact
could conceivably consider the

organization might not lose its exemption for this one instance, it could

be at risk. Under the expenditure test, on the other hand, the organization
could engage in152five times this amount and still remain safely within allowable limits.
elect the
The irony is that only about one percent of eligible charities
53 Many orrigid.1
too
and
expenditure test because it is seen as too new
ganizations seem to perceive a disadvantage in losing the ability to argue
that their level of lobbying activity is insubstantial, even in the face of an
IRS challenge, or fear an increased risk of auditing under a mathematical
test.154 What organizations may also fail to consider is the difference in
at 26 C.F.R. pts.
Private Foundations, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,826, 51,838 (1988) (to be codified
1,53,56).
is capped at
150. Further calculations show that the grassroots non-taxable amount
note 144.
supra
See
$20,000).
of
amount
non-taxable
lobbying
the
of
$5,000 (25%
close to
come
even
not
may
numbers
$1,000 is 20% of that limit. These hypothetical
organizasome
to
compared
as
maintenance
site
Web
of
costs
illustrating the minimal
one nonprofit
tions' total budgets. See, e.g., Demko & Moore, supra note 8 (noting that
of its $1.7
annually
$3,600
about
only
spends
group, after its initial design expenditures,
million budget to maintain its Web site).
there is
151. See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (1974). Although
an exsuch
impact,
at
look
IRS
the
no specific requirement-or even suggestion-that
able
be
may
IRS
the
indication
only
the
that
therefore,
posit,
I
amination is not precluded.
longer
no
may
effort
or
to use in this new context is impact, where level of expenditure
exert.
be commensurate with the kind of influence an organization is able to
152. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (1994).
prefer the
153. See FISHMAN & ScivARZ, supra note 53, at 532 ("[S]ome charities
of the §
requirements
recordkeeping
and
specificity
the
to
rules
vagueness of the general
approximately
of
4,000
than
501(h) election.... In fact, it has been reported that fewer
test election.").
380,000 eligible § 501(c)(3) organizations have made the expenditure
Election, re501(h)
Section
Regarding
Charities
154. See Open Letter to Eligible
disagree
particularly
"We
533-34.
at
53,
note
supra
SCmvARz,
&
printed in FISHMA
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penalties. The penalty for lobbying activities deemed substantial under
the first test is loss of tax exemption; the punishment is absolute
and can
be imposed after only one year of substantial lobbying expenditures. 55
Under the expenditure test, on the other hand, there is an intermediate
level of penalty-an excise tax of twenty-five percent of the
excess lobbying expenditures.1 56 It is only when lobbying expenditures
above the
limits become excessive for four consecutive years that the organization
will lose its exemption. 5 7
For the IRS, this disparity may become a cause for concern. It
would
be difficult for the IRS to regulate lobbying activities on the
Web using
either test (because level of expenditure is still a significant factor
in the
substantial part test),158 but it is particularly difficult under the
expenditure-based test that the IRS has been urging. Several commentators
have
proposed other methods of monitoring lobbying activities, focusing
less
on the level of expenditure and more on the nature of the activities.' 9
For
example, Jeffrey Hart, "a commentator opposed to lobbying
by chari-

with those who, while recognizing the benefits [of § 501(h) election],
decline to elect
because of a vague concern that present or future administrations
may target electing
groups for audit. Internal Revenue Service officials have repeatedly
denied that election
has-or will have-any such effect." Id. at 534. The 17 attorneys, accountants,
and academics who wrote this "open letter" to charities also highlight the
relative benefits, including the ability to predict what is allowable and the lesser sanctions
that can be imposed before tax exemption is revoked. See id. at 533-34.
155. See FISHMAN & SCMVAPZ, supra note 53, at 533.
156. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (1994); see also FISHMAN & SCIBVARZ,
supra note 53, at
531.
157. Loss of exemption will be imposed under the expenditure test
if
tion "normally" (interpreted as over a four-year period) makes lobbying the organizaexcess of 150% of the nontaxable (allowable) amounts. See I.R.C. expenditures in
§ 501(h)(1)(A),
(h)(2)(B) (1994).
158. See supra text accompanying note 140 (discussing the factors
the IRS will
generally consider under the substantial part test).
159. See Jeffrey Hart, Foundationsand Social Activism: A
Critical

View, in THE
FuTuRE OF FOUNDATIONS 43, 47-48 (Fritz. F. Heimann ed., 1973);
Laura
B. Chisolm,
Exempt
OrganizationAdvocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales,
63 IND. L.J. 201,

294-98 (1987-1988).
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ties," 160 has suggested using a constituency-based test for allowable lobbying activities. 6 Under his proposed restrictions, only organizations
having broad, well-established constituencies with generally accepted
and goals (such as labor unions and veterans groups) would qualviews
but procedurally
ify for exemption.162 Proposing a substantively different
similar test, commentator Laura Chisolm has also suggested a constituaency-based test;163 however, she would exclude those organizations that
proHart would test; andallow those that Hart would exclude. Chisoos
pur"educational"
charitable,
for
posed allowing lobbying activities
64 and for the benefit of traditionally under-served and underposes
165

or the homeless).
represented groups (such as children
Under either the substantial part test or the section 501(h) expenditure test, there does not currently exist an appropriate mechanism for assessing whether an organization is engaging in more than allowable lobbying activities. Chisolm expressly recognized this problem, stating that
reporting process is essential if the aim is to identify
"[a]
withhold section 501(c)(3) benefits from purportedly 'charitable'
and better-designed
o

(t

fm

p

,,166

c rn

Another comorganizations which simply promote private interests.
the IRS's rethat
out
pointed
mentator, in a somewhat different context,
organizatax-exempt
porting requirements, centering on Form 990 (the
substanthe
tion's annual tax return form), are inadequate for capturing
tive information necessary to make a determination of whether activities
are charitable. 167 The problem seems to lie in the mechanism through
which Congress has chosen to monitor tax-exempt organizations-the
160.
161.
162.

Galston, supra note 34, at 1306.
See id. at 1306-07.
See Hart, supra note 159, at 47-48; see also Galston, supra note 34, at 1306-

08.

163. See Chisolm, supra note 159, at 294-98.
164. See id. at 285-86.
165. See id. at 284.
166. Id. at 286.
167. See Oliver A. Houck, With CharityforAll, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1517 (1984)
(arguing that better mechanisms should be promulgated to determine whether so-called
public interest law firms are actually promoting private interests).
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Internal Revenue Code. The IRS is ill-equipped to monitor anything
from a vantage point other than a primarily (or exclusively) expenditurebased one.
B. Should the Development, Maintenance and Use of Web Sites Be
ConsideredLobbying Expenditures?
Under the current tests, it would seem that the development of a Web
site cannot be considered a lobbying expenditure, unless the stated purpose is to engage in grassroots lobbying. 168 And as long as the predominant use of the site is not lobbying, the maintenance of the site would not
be considered exclusively a lobbying expenditure. Specifically, under the
section 501(h) expenditure test, the Code provides for allocation of expenditures that are for multiple purposes among the three types of
expenditures-non-lobbying, direct lobbying, and grassroots lobbying. 169
Allocable expenses generally include salaries of employees who spend
some of their time on lobbying activities, overhead costs, and costs
of
70
newsletters. 1
An appropriate analogy to Web site expenditures might be telephone
costs. The installation of a phone system and the maintenance of that system (including, for example, repairs, voice mail set-up, and general
phone company charges) would not be thought of as lobbying expenditures; 171 if, however, an organization used its phone system for little
more than calling members of the public and urging them to contact their
representatives to encourage them to vote a particular way on pending
legislation, the phone costs would then likely be considered primarily
lobbying expenditures. 172 Similarly, if an organization uses its Web site
purely for encouraging the public to contact legislators, the Web
site
168. See I.R.C. § 4911(c)(3) (1994); see also supra notes 25-33 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Code's definition of lobbying, including grassroots
lobbying.

169.
170.
171.
172.

See I.R.C. § 501(h) (1994).
See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-3(a)(3) (1986).
SeeI.R.C. § 501(h) (1994).
See id.
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costs would most likely be considered lobbying expenditures. Along the
same lines, the posting of non-partisan analysis-the production of
which is not considered a lobbying or taxable expenditure under the
Code173 -on the Web would not convert it into a lobbying expenditure.
One area in which the IRS could consider Web site use to be entirely
a lobbying expenditure is in conjunction with the lobbying restrictions'
prohibition of mass media communications, 174 though there is no specific
175
reference to Internet technology in the current regulations. The rule is
that any paid advertisement appearing in "mass media" will be "presumed to be a grassroots lobbying communication" if, "Within two weeks
before a vote by a legislative body ...on a highly publicized piece of
legislation, ... [it] reflects a view on the ... legislation and ... encourThe regulations do
ages the public to communicate with legislators.
not indicate what is considered to be mass media; it is likely, however,
that the Internet would fall under any definition because it is possible to
reach large segments of the population via the Web or electronic mail.
As one commentator, discussing the Supreme Court decision in Reno,
suggests, "[T]he rapid emergence of the Internet has brought with it the
most accessible, dynamic, and democratic form of mass communication
in history ....It provides an outlet for a cacophony of ideas with virtually no geographic, economic, social, or political restraints, giving a
in a way the Constitution's Framers could only have
voice to the People177
possible."'
dreamed

173.

See id. § 4945(f).

174. See id. § 4945.
175. In fact, current indicators of what is considered mass media would suggest
that the Internet may not be included. See Lobbying by Public Charities; Lobbying by
Private Foundations, 53 Fed. Reg. 51838 (1988) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53,
56) ("'mass media' means television, radio, and general circulation newspapers and
magazines"). Note, however, that the proposed regulations referenced here were suggested in 1988, while the Internet was much less known or used than it is more than a
decade later.
176. Id.
177. Stephen C. Jacques, Reno v. ACLU: Insulatingthe Internet, the FirstAmendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REv.1945, 1947 (1997).
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SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR PRIvATE FOUNDATIONS

Much of the discussion above has focused on lobbying restrictions as
they apply to public charities, as these are the organizations likely to be
engaging in lobbying activities. However, private foundations are subject
to even more stringent regulations against lobbying expenditures; foundations are prohibited from making any expenditures or providing any
funding at all for lobbying activities.1 78
Private foundations are charitable organizations formed to distribute
funds in furtherance of their own specified goals. 179 They range in size

from small community-based foundations with minimal assets, relying
on annual contributions and dedicated to helping that community, to na-

tional foundations with large endowments providing funding for national
and international initiatives. 180 The primary mechanism used by foundations for achieving their goals is grants. 18 Whether proactively seeking

178. See I.R.C. § 4945 (1994).
179. The definition of a "foundation" offered in The Foundation Directory, which
is published by the Foundation Center, is:
[A] foundation ... [is] a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization with its own funds (usually from a single source, either an individual, family or corporation) and program managed by its own trustees and directors, which was established to maintain or aid educational, social, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the
common welfare primarily by making grants to other nonprofit organizations.
THE FOUNDATION CENTER, THE FOUNDATION DIRECrORY, at v (1994); see generally
DAviD F. FREEMAN, THE HANDBOOK ON PRiVATE FOUNDATIONS 1-9 (rev. ed. 1991).
180. See FREEMAN, supra note 179, at 6-7.
181. See Glossary, TaE FOUNDATION CENTER'S USER-FRIENDLY GUIDE, INTERNET
EDmON (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http: //fdncenter.orglonlib/ufg/ufggloss.html>. The
Glossary defines "private foundation" as follows:
A nongovernmental, nonprofit organization with funds (usually
from a single source, such as an individual, family, or corporation)
and program managed by its own trustees or directors. Private foundations are established to maintain or aid social, educational, reli-
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funding proposals to meet the guidelines already set by foundation officers and trustees, or reactively responding to unsolicited proposals, founfunding. 18 2
dations have different methods of deciding where to provide
a
But the ultimate result of a decision to provide funding is the making18 of
3
purpose.
specified
a
for
funds
of
sum
specified
a
of
grant-an award
In response to a perceived threat of undue influence by wealthy contributors to private foundations and by foundation managers, Congress
184
promulgated an extensive series of restrictions on private foundations.
In addition to mandates to refrain from any legislative or political campaign activities, foundations must pay taxes on all net investment income
each year.185
and distribute a certain percentage of their investment assets
There are strict rules against self-dealing, financial practices, and program activities. 8 6 The penalties are severe, ranging from excise taxes to
revocation of tax exemption.187
Although grantee organizations-most often the public charities that
have been the focus of much of this article-are limited in the level of
expenditures they can make for lobbying activities, foundations are not
required to inquire whether the prospective grantee is in compliance with
the regulations. 188 The inquiry can stop at the particular project being
funded, and a foundation may rely on statements of purpose by a prospective grantee-as long as the grantee is a qualified section 501(c)(3)
legislation' 90
organization, 189 the purpose of the grant is not to influence
gious, or other charitable activities serving the public welfare, primarily through the making of grants.
Id.
182. See FREEMAN, supra note 179, at 6.
183. One dictionary definition of "grant" is "a gift for a particular purpose."
MNRRIAM-WEBSTER DICIONARY 312 (1974).
184. For a full discussion of Congressional fears of and "assaults" on large private
foundations, see WALDEiMiAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 7-17 (1972).
185. See I.R.C. §§ 509, 4940-4946 (1994).
186. See id.
187. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
188. See I.R.C. § 4945(f)(1) (1994).
189. Seeid.
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and is nonpartisan, 191 and the organization meets several other criteria
(such as having a wide base of funding support 92). A foundation may
also exercise "expenditure responsibility' ' 193 over any particular grant,
which "means that the private foundation is responsible to exert all reasonable efforts and to establish adequate procedures" to ensure that the
94
grantee will comply with the regulations.1
It is also worth noting the distinction between project-based support
and core (or general) support of an organization. Grantee organizations
will generally obtain the bulk of their funding through project-specific
support. 195 They will have other expenses, however, that cannot be attributed to any one project or that were not adequately covered through
project support. These expenses are built into the organization's core
budget.196 Some foundations provide core support to select organizations
that advance goals similar to the goals of the foundation. 197 As long as
the grantee organization is a qualified section 501(c)(3) organization, the
foundation is not required to monitor or ensure that its activities do not
98
constitute lobbying.
One provision that could, under the current regulations, provide
some cause for concern among foundations funding nonpartisan analysis
is the "subsequent use rule."' 199 If a grantee uses its nonpartisan analysis
190. See id. § 4945(f).

191. See id. § 4945(f)(2).
192. See id. § 4945(f)(4).
193.

See id. § 4945(h).

194. Id. The procedures must be implemented: "(1) to see that the grant is spent
solely for the purpose for which made, (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the
grantee on how the funds are spent, and (3) to make full and detailed reports with respect
to such expenditures ..... Id. § 4945(h)(1)-(h)(3).
195. See The Foundation Center: Online Orientation to the GrantseekingProcess

(visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://fdncenter.org/onlib/orientlorg5.html>.
196. See The Foundation Center: Frequently Asked Questions (visited February
26,2000) <http://fdncenter.orglonlib/faqs/faq.html>.
197.

See id.

198. See I.R.C. § 4945 (1994).
199. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 56.4945-2, 56.4911-2 (1990).
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or research for a lobbying activity-accompanied by a direct encouragement to action, within six months of receipt of the last payment of
foundation funds-and the IRS determines that the organization's primary purpose in undertaking or preparing the analysis was for subsequent use in lobbying, the foundation will be taxed on the amount as if it
200
had funded the analysis as a lobbying activity from the start. With the
advent of the World Wide Web, the organization could disseminate the
analysis much more quickly and use it to prompt its constituents to lobby
their legislators, posing a greater risk of subsequent-use determinations.
If the tax regulations of exempt organizations as they pertain to lobbying continue as they have for the past sixty plus years, private foundations may have little cause for concern in funding Web sites, provided
they monitor the grant proposals as they normally would (or should).
What would happen, however, if the regulations were shifted to a substantive-based test, such as those proposed by commentators Hart and
Chisolm (discussed above)?20 1 If Congress is to monitor lobbying activities on the Internet effectively, it will have to institute some changes in
monitoring practice and in how it penalizes organizations for such activities.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Internet has opened up entire new areas of potential regulation.
Not surprisingly, the law is slow to catch up. The dual public policies of
keeping the Treasury out of political affairs and of keeping the Internet
free from excessive regulation may eventually come head to head, in
2
light of strong vocal arguments on both sides of the regulation debate.
Charities are just beginning to explore the options presented by Internet

200. See id.
201. See supra notes 159-167 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Jill Lawrence, PoliticalBattlegrounds of the Future, USA TODAY,
Aug. 8, 1997, at 6A ("Technology marches on in ... cyberspace, opening new frontiers
of political and moral conflict. [A] Supreme Court rulingl this year against... Internet
censorship signal[s] the beginning rather than the end of [that] debateo.").
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technology for furthering their tax-exempt purposes.0 3 Congress may be
forced to choose which public policy is more worthy: the neutrality of
the Treasury in political affairs or the free access to information on the
Internet. If it decides to regulate heavily those activities in which charities engage on the Web, it may have to promulgate a new series of substance-based regulations. The Internal Revenue Service may then no
longer be the appropriate venue for such regulations, as it is ill-equipped
to monitor such activities even through an expenditure-based test.
Pamela O'Kane Foster

203. See, e.g., Audrie Krause, The On-Line Activist: Tools for Organizing in Cyberspace: PartOne: E-mail (Apr. 28, 1997) <http://www.mojones.com/hellraiser-central
/features/krausel.html>.

